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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of voice telephony based on the Internet protocol (VoIP) has had, and 
will continue to have, a profound impact on the telecommunications landscape. Without 
even  mentioning  the  threat  posed  by  Internet  companies,  incumbent  operators  were 
forced  to  think  beyond  milking  the  PSTN  (public  switched  telephony  network).  A 
possible response is to introduce VoIP quickly and at low prices, while incurring the cost 
of cannibalizing PSTN revenues. For instance, in order to compete with cable operators, 
Dutch incumbent KPN had hastened to introduce VoIP telephony. The telecoms operator 
wasn’t  prepared  for  the  large  uptake  during  the  first  year,  which  resulted  in  serious 
installation  problems  and  quality/service  issues.
4  In  this  new  landscape  faced  by 
incumbent  operators  in  liberalized  markets,  the  nature  of  competition  between 
incumbents and entrants is substantially changing, compared to what has been observed 
in the early  years after liberalization of the telecoms sector. 
 
This paper explores competition between an incumbent offering both PSTN and VoIP 
telephony  (or  voice  over  broadband,  VoB),  and  an  entrant  present  only  in  the  latter 
segment. It investigates the effects of regulation in one segment on competition in the 
other, unregulated segment, and explores possibly undesirable side effects of access price 
regulation. Based on the obtained insights, it discusses various policy implications. 
 
A  situation  is  considered  in  which  an  incumbent  with  a  history  in  PSTN  telephony, 
competes  with  a  newcomer  in  the  VoIP  segment.  The  incumbent  has  a  local  access 
network  with  complete  coverage.  The  entrant  may  be  a  cable  operator  with  a  full-
coverage broadband network, or a newcomer without a local network, making use of 
mandatory unbundling of the incumbent’s local loop to reach end-users. The incumbent 
offers PSTN (public switched telephone network) voice telephony to one segment of 
customers, as well as VoIP services to another segment, while the entrant only offers 
VoIP services in the latter segment. Consumers can choose between staying with the 
 
4  KPN  made  VoIP  telephony  available  in  February  2006.  See  “KPN  Suffers  VOIP  Hiccup”,  Light  Reading,  8  May  2007,  
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=123468.   5 
PSTN network versus migrating to VoIP services. In this setting, this paper explores to 
what extent regulatory intervention in the PSTN segment may distort the adoption of 
VoIP by consumers, and operators’ investment incentives. 
 
In particular, the focus is on the effects of regulation of PSTN terminating access prices 
and the effects of regulation of the PSTN retail price. Accordingly, regulation of the VoIP 
market itself is outside the scope of this paper, which looks instead at the broader picture 
in which PSTN and VoIP are connected market segments. In particular, it is discussed 
how the level of the PSTN access charge and the level of the PSTN retail price affect the 
intensity of competition in the VoIP segment and the speed of consumer migration to 
VoIP. By adopting a welfare perspective, policy implications are derived. 
 
While short-run effects of regulation on retail competition appear to be important, the 
impact on investment levels should not be ignored. The analysis is therefore extended to 
study the effect of access regulation on investment incentives in the VoIP segment. One 
can then observe that, in general, an access price different from cost levels generates 
asymmetric  incentives  for  incumbent  and  entrant.  Often  the  incumbent  has  weaker 
investment incentives, because it cannabalizes revenues in the PSTN-segment. However, 
no unambiguous results with respect to investment incentives can be derived. Because of 
the effect of investment on wholesale PSTN revenues, the incumbent’s rather than the 
entrant’s investment may turn out to be more profitable at the margin. 
 
The policy relevance of this paper is evident. It looks at the broader regulatory picture, in 
which PSTN and VoIP market segments cannot be viewed separately. The point is this 
may  be  at  odds  with  the  idea  behind  the  European  regulatory  framework  for 
communications  markets,  which  has  tended  to  view  market  segments  in  relatively 
isolated contexts, and offers regulatory instruments to be applied within “markets” in 
which  a  problem  occurs.
5  This  paper  demonstrates  that  “compartmentalizing” 
communications market may conflict with maximizing overall consumer or total welfare, 
 
5 This tendency has diminished with the reduction of the number of predefined markets over time, but nevertheless, the underlying 
philosophy places little weight on the interconnectedness of market segments (De Bijl & Peitz, 2008).   6 
especially if the regulatory process cannot keep up with the speed at which operators 
adapt  their  business  strategies,  and  the  speed  at  which  consumers  change  their 
communications  behaviors.  The  message  is  that,  if  only  because  of  network 
interconnection, regulators should be aware of the explicit effects that PSTN regulation 
may have on the emerging VoIP market. It is surprising that regulatory practice has not 
put more explicit attention to this type of interdependence. This may partly be due to 
considerations of a universal service obligation regarding PSTN or by market power with 
regard  to  PSTN  call  termination,  that  create  a  bias  towards  existing  regulations. 
Nevertheless, within the European regulatory framework, such considerations can easily 
introduce distortions when the technological environment changes over time (for a policy 
document  on  such  considerations,  see  OECD,  2006).  This  paper  articulates  how 
regulation in one segment can have undesirable side effects in another segment, both 
through strategic pricing interaction and through investment incentives. 
 
This paper builds on the literature on “one-way” and “two-way” access (for overviews, 
see e.g. Armstrong, 2002, and Vogelsang, 2003; for references to recent contributions on 
two-way access see Peitz et al., 2004) by analyzing the emergence of VoIP networks in a 
PSTN environment, and in which the PSTN and VoIP networks are interconnected.
6 Part 
of  this  paper  draws  on  De  Bijl  and  Peitz  (2009),  which  provides  a  formal  (game-
theoretic) analysis of imperfect competition between an incumbent active in both PSTN 
and VoIP, and a VoIP entrant. This paper is also related to the literature on investment 
incentives in infrastructure markets (see Valletti, 2003; and Gans, 2006). Foros (2004) 
models  a  situation  of  a  vertically  integrated  firm  controlling  both  local  access  and 
providing broadband access, and a downstream Internet retailer. The focus of that paper 
is mainly on regulation as a way to induce the integrated firm to invest efficiently and to 
deter it from foreclosing the market – in this paper the regulator cannot commit to a 
particular policy before investment decisions are made. Also related is Hansen (2006), 
addressing regulatory concerns with respect to the migration from fixed to mobile. 
 
 
6 Relevant contributions to the access price issue in environments in which firms enjoy market power include Ebrill and Slutsky (1990), 
Laffont and Tirole (1994), Armstrong and Vickers (1998), Lewis and Sappington (1999), and De Bijl and Peitz (2006b).   7 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some illustrative data and discusses 
some elements of the analysis. Section 3 presents the stylized model. Section 4 explores 
how access regulation in the PSTN segment affects competition in the VoIP segment. 
Section 5 discusses how the incentives to invest in VoIP can be affected by PSTN access 
regulation. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Developments in broadband and VoIP 
 
The emergence of VoIP is closely linked to developments in broadband Internet access. 
Initially, broadband connections were primarily meant for Internet access. Worldwide, 
(narrowband)  dial-up  access  to  the  Internet  has  been  in  decline  due  to  migration  to 
broadband access. In January 2009, the penetration rate of broadband was 23.9% of the 
EU  population.
7  One  years  earlier,  it  was  20,2%,  coming  from  about  7%  in  2004. 
Penetration is different among EU member states. At the beginning of 2009, it ranged 
from 11% in Slovakia to almost 37% in Denmark and the Netherlands. Outside of the 
EU, Korea was traditionally leading (25% in 2005, and 32% in the fourth quarter of 
2008), but was recently overtaken by Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway (34.5% in 
fourth  quarter  of  2008).  Growth  rates  of  broadband  penetration  remain  high: in  June 
2009, the Netherlands was frontrunner (38.1%), followed by Denmark (37.0%), while 
Korea was at position five (32.8%). 
DSL, the prevalent broadband technology in Europe, Australia and New Zealand, has 
been  the  main  force  driving  the  migration  to  VoIP,  also  in  countries  in  which  cable 
modems have traditionally played important roles. In Europe, the share of DSL relative to 
other broadband technologies has gradually been declining since a couple of years. In 
 
7 The data reported in this section is taken from the 14th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, 
published  by  the  European  Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/annualreports/14th/index_en.htm  and  OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband. See also De Bijl and Peitz (2006a).   8 
January 2009, the shares in the EU were as follows: DSL 79.4%, cable 15.3%, fiber 
1.4%, WLL 1.1%, and other platforms (e.g. satellite) 2.8%.  
 
The  number  and  variety  of  IP-based  telephony  service  propositions  are  large  and 
increasing,  and  terms  like  VoIP,  IP  telephony  and  Internet  telephony  are  often  used 
interchangeably. This paper looks at “managed” VoIP and voice over broadband (VoB).
8 
In December 2007, (managed) VoIP originated calls represented 8.3% of fixed telephony 
traffic in the EU, led by the Netherlands (32% IP originated calls) and France (27%). 
 
Consider  the  emergence  of  managed  VoIP  by  focusing  on  competition  between  an 
incumbent and an entrant, in a stylized set-up that will be used throughout this paper to 
derive regulatory implications. The incumbent offers both PSTN and IP-based telephony 
through DSL technology. That is, the incumbent is still in the process of upgrading its 
network from a PSTN to an all-IP network, and therefore still able to offer both services. 
The entrant may be an operator with or without a local access network. If the entrant does 
not have a local network itself, it can reach end-users through local-loop unbundling 
(LLU),  that  is,  by  leasing  the  incumbent’s  unbundled  local  connections,  or  through 
bitstream access.
9 If a customer switches to a LLU-based entrant, he or she completely 
substitutes  the  PSTN  service  with  the  entrant’s  IP-based  service.  Alternatively,  the 
entrant may have its own local network, for instance cable, fibre or WLL. In many local 
markets,  this  competitor  is  a  cable  company  that  has  upgraded  its  network  to  offer 
broadband  internet  access  and  IP-based  telephony.  As  this  set-up  captures  essential 
elements of the market structure in countries like, for instance, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Germany, conclusions can be derived that have wider relevance in the light of current 
regulatory issues. Also in countries in which the incumbent in the PSTN-segment has so 
far refrained from offering VoIP-telephony, the analysis is relevant since it can shed light 
 
8 This paper abstracts from “unmanaged”, that is, peer-to-peer software-based, VoIP services, such as Skype. The most recent “Progress 
Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market” by the European Commission hasn’t yet included peer-to-
peer/unmanaged VoIP in its descriptive statistics of the development of VoIP. This can easily change once the handset becomes more like 
a computer, as is already happening in mobile telephony, raising a range of new issues (e.g. whether mobile operators should allow their 
customers to use Skype). As discussed in the conclusion, including such players in the analysis would require a different set-up, which is 
left for future work. 
9 This paper abstracts from regulatory problems associated with the setting of the wholesale lease price of local loops. For this issue, see 
e.g. De Bijl and Peitz (2002).   9 
on  the  strategic  incentives  of  the  PSTN-operator  to  postpone  entry  into  the  VoIP-
segment. 
 
As a starting point, suppose that the incumbent charges for call termination on its PSTN, 
and that no termination charges are used for calls terminated on IP networks. This is in 
line  with  the  observation  that  the  incremental  cost  of  call  termination  on  IP-based 
networks tends towards zero, in contrast to PSTN networks. Actually, such a structure of 
access prices may in some market environments be seen as a good approximation of the 
outcome of negotiations between VoIP and PSTN operators. As stated in OECD (2006, p. 
26), “[...] it seems likely in reality that VoIP operators might not charge PSTN operators 
for IP termination while PSTN operators would still charge VoIP operators for the same 
call in the opposite direction, due to the VoIP providers’ weaker negotiation power.” 
Note,  however,  the  importance  of  analyzing  different  interconnection  agreements 
between VoIP networks.
10 Indeed, one can observe in a number of countries that VoIP 






10 See Yoon (2006) for such an analysis. 
11 See section 4.2.   10 
3. Fixed Telephony with a PSTN and a VoIP-Segment 
 
Consider a stylized market for voice services in which a consumer can maintain its PSTN 
connection  or  upgrade  to  VoIP,  in  the  form  of  a  VoB  connection.
12  Based  on  these 
decisions, a PSTN segment of relative size λ0 and a VoIP segment of λ result (adding up 
to  1).
13  PSTN  is  offered  by  the  incumbent,  called  operator  1,  only,  whereas  VoIP is 
offered by the incumbent and an entrant, operator 2 (see the previous section). Since the 
focus is on competition in the VoIP-segment, one can take the retail price in the PSTN-
segment, p0, as a parameter throughout most of the discussion. This is appropriate if, for 
instance, the retail price is regulated, or if competition in the PSTN segment comes from 
pure  resale  competitors,  whose  conditions  for  access  are  regulated.
14  Although  the 
discussion is simplified by having only two firms competing in the VoIP segment, the 
main insights are robust to analyzing a small number of VoIP providers with some degree 
of  market  power  (a  situation  of  oligopoly  or  imperfect  competition).  The  operators 
compete  in  the  VoIP  segment  by  choosing  fixed  fees  p1  resp.  p2.  Indeed,  in  many 
countries one can observe a move towards flat rates, and therefore, abstracting from per-
call or per-minute prices seems to become a good description of actual fixed telecoms 
markets.
15 Thus, consumers have an inelastic demand for one unit of the good (they will 
not purchase more than one subscription, no matter how cheap). Market shares in the 
VoIP segment are denoted by si(p1, p2), i = 1, 2. 
 
The timing of events is as follows. At the outset, the charge for terminating access to 
PSTN-customers, called a, is given (e.g. because of regulation). Similarly for the PSTN 
retail price p0. 
 
 
12 See De Bijl and Peitz (2009) for a complete and detailed model and analysis. 
13 Note that as long as the firm offering PSTN-services can distinguish between the different types of incoming calls, namely if they come 
from a PSTN-connection or a VoIP-connection, it is immaterial for the modeling whether firms run an IP-based network in their backbone or 
whether they still operate a circuit-switched network. 
14 Pure resale competitors can easily included in the analysis without affecting the results. 
15 This paper abstracts from software-based IP-solutions in which consumers substitute single calls. Clearly, in an ideal world of flat rates 
such incentives for substitution are present only if there are important quality differences. Such individual call substitution takes place in 
practice. Full migration is considered here. Individual call substitution would not affect the main insights. Note that this is not the case for 
international calls, where the cost savings of using a PC rather than a telephone may be substantial. Such calls are typically outside of the 
basket of services covered by the flat subscription fee.   11 
•  At t = 1, consumers form beliefs about prices in the VoIP segment.  
•  At t = 2, based on their individual preferences (which are heterogenous among 
consumers)  and  beliefs,  consumers  choose  between  PSTN  and  VoIP,  while 
simultaneously, firms 1 and 2 set VoIP retail prices.  
•  At t = 3, consumers observe retail prices and make purchase decisions, that is, 
consumers who stayed with PSTN purchase from the incumbent, while consumers 
upgrading to VoIP choose between the incumbent and the entrant. Consequently, 
market shares and profit levels are realized. 
 
Concerning the timing, before consumers learn the prices of VoIP services, they already 
hold (equilibrium) beliefs about the prices that they can expect after their technology 
adoption decision. Think of a situation in which consumers have already heard or read 
about  the  new  technology,  for  instance  through  friends,  magazine  articles,  and  trade 
announcements. Hence, they know that the new technology exists. Based on the prices 
they  expect,  they  make  their  “costly”  technology  adoption  decision  (think  of  this  as 
consumers making a choice before they “go shopping”). Thus, consumers’ technology 
adoption is a lumpy decision that is not reversed if actual prices change (however, it is 
easy to change the provider for a given technology). An alternative motivation of the 
proposed timing is to postulate that consumers do mental accounting in decision making 
(Thaler, 1999). It is important to remark that in the problem explored here, it is formally 
equivalent to analyze a game in which consumers first decide simultaneously between 
PSTN and VoIP, and next, operators set VoIP prices.
16 
 
Given the segment size of PSTN customers  0 λ , it is assumed that each customer makes 
exactly  this  share  of  calls  to  PSTN-customers.  This  occurs  if  calling  patterns  are 
balanced.
17 Thus, a VoIP operator has to make, on average, a payment of  a 0 λ  for each 
customer  subscribed  to  its  network.  While  this  assumption  is  not  essential  for  the 
argument, it allows one to express objective functions in an unambiguous way. Further, 
while operators have to pay for terminating access on the PSTN network it is assumed (at 
 
16 See the companion paper De Bijl and Peitz (2009) for a more elaborate exposition. 
17 This situation provides a natural starting point for the analysis. For more on this, see De Bijl and Peitz (2002, 2009).   12 
this point) that there are no termination charges for calls that terminate with a VoIP 
customer. In section 4 it will be discussed what happens if there are terminating access 
charges for calls from the PSTN to VoIP customers. 
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2009) choose a particular parametrization in this model, which the 
interested reader may want to consult. However, the main results are robust to variations 
and the purpose of the following discussion is to elaborate on these main results and the 
underlying mechanisms. Concerning the methodology, the analysis will be restricted to 
situations  which  are  strategically  stable,  in  the  sense  that  no  player  would  have  an 
incentive  to  deviate  from  its  action,  given  the  actions  of  the  other  players  (a  “Nash 
equilibrium”). Also, it is postulated that actors foresee the effect of their actions on future 
outcomes and that beliefs that lead to such actions are confirmed. 
 
The regulatory environment and in particular prices  a and p0 are known by the firms 
before  other  decisions  are  made.  While  this  is  a  heroic  assumption  in  the  dynamic 
landscape of telecoms, the underlying notion is that operators have expectations about the 
type of regulatory policy, and that individual deviations by firms (e.g. in their pricing 
decisions) will not make regulators reconsider their regulatory principles. This means that 
the regulator has built up quite some reputation for “sticking to its guns”.
18 
 
Based  on  the  announced  or  inferred  access  regime,  operators  make  their  investment 
decisions (in infrastrucure and services). Section 5 will focus on investment incentives; 
for  the  moment,  those  investments  are  assumed  to  be  given.  At t  =  2,  based  on the 
resulting product characteristics customers make their migration decisions; each customer 
individually decides whether to remain with PSTN-telephony or migrate to VoIP. At this 
point, consumers have to form expectations about p1 resp. p2. These expectations are 
consistent with the expected degree of competition in the VoIP-segment, since this will 
determine the price level for VoIP compared to PSTN-telephony. For instance, customers 
 
18 Relatedly, Deutsche Telekom communicated in 2005 that some of its investment plans were conditional on the regulatory policy that will 
be applied in the future. In line with the modelling assumption, this corresponds to seeking the kind of regulatory commitment on which it 
then bases its investment decision. Commitment by the regulator is always a demanding requirement; however, the vast majority of the 
formal analyses of the effects of regulatory intervention require commitment.    13 
foresee that regulation favoring the PSTN-segment through increasing access price a, 
increases costs for VoIP suppliers, and hence leads to higher VoIP prices. At t = 3, based 
on  the  expected  segment  sizes  of  PSTN  and  VoIP  (reflecting  customers’  migration 
decisions),  operators  set  VoIP  prices  p1  resp.  p2.  The  price  difference  in  the  VoIP 
segment determines market shares s1(p1, p2) and s2(p1, p2). 
 
Suppose that the operators have market power in the retail market, so that each operator 
can  sustain  a  strictly  positive  price-cost  margin.  Due  to  fixed  costs  and  initial 
investments, these margins do not necessarily make operators profitable, but they are a 
precondition for an operator to be active. There are a number of justifications for the 
existence  of  market  power.  In  line  with  most  of  the  theoretical  literature  on 
telecommunications markets (see e.g. the references in de Bijl & Peitz, 2002; and Peitz, 
Valletti, & Wright, 2004) one can argue that operators offer differentiated services. For 
technological reasons this is clearly the case for PSTN versus VoIP. But also within the 
VoIP segment, providers have ample opportunity to differentiate themselves, for instance 
through marketing and image building. 
 
The incumbent’s profits derive from revenues in the PSTN and in the VoIP-segment. 
Denote the marginal cost of call termination on the PSTN by c. Since a share  0 λ  of calls 
terminates on the PSTN-segment the associated costs are  c 0 λ  (this is independent of the 
segment  and  operator  a  consumer  belongs  to).  Hence  the  profit  margin  per  PSTN 
consumer is  0 0 p c λ − . Similarly the profit margin per VoIP consumer subscribing to the 
incumbent  is  c p 0 1 λ − .  All  remaining  VoIP  consumers  contribute  ) ( 0 c a− λ   to  the 
incumbent’s (wholesale) profits. Hence, the incumbent’s profit can be expressed as: 
 
)] ( ) , ( ) )( , ( [ ) ( ) , , ( 0 2 1 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 c a p p s c p p p s c p p p p − + − + − = λ λ λ λ λ π ,
  (1) 
 
and rewritten as: 
   14 
)] ( [ )] )( , ( [ )] ( [ ) , , ( 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 c a a p p p s c p p p p − + − + − = λλ λ λ λ λ π   .
  (2) 
 
This can be understood as follows: the VoIP part pays an internal transfer price for access 
to  the  PSTN  part  of  the  incumbent.  However,  since  the  incumbent  operates  as  an 
integrated firm, strategic incentives are not affected by the level of the transfer price. 
 
It is now straighforward that the entrant’s profits take the form 
  
) )( , ( ) , , ( 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 a p p p s p p p λ λ π − = .          (3) 
 
Before going deeper, consider the benchmark case in which λ  and  0 λ  are assumed to be 
fixed (not affected by pricing decisions). Note that a change of the access price has two 
effects for the incumbent: it affects retail revenues in the VoIP segment, which is the 
expression in the second square bracket in equation (2), and it affects wholesale or access 
revenues, which is the expression in the third square bracket. An increase of the access 
price  unambiguously  increases  wholesale  revenues.  In  addition,  the  level  of  these 
revenues is independent of the retail prices which are eventually chosen. Thus, the effect 
of the access price on wholesale revenues is neutral on incentives in the retail market. 
Hence, what drives the incumbent’s price setting in the VoIP market is the second term in 
square brackets in equation (2). In a symmetric setting, the access price therefore affects 
both firms symmetrically. The increase of the access price, weighted by the market share 
of the PSTN segment reflects perceived marginal costs. In an equilibrium, higher access 
prices  feed  one-to-one  into  higher  retail  prices.  Consequently,  since  the  entrant  only 
makes retail profits in the VoIP segment, its profits are not affected. Thus, when the 
migration decision is determined in the first place by beliefs about VoIP prices (and not 
directly by observed price levels), then as long as PSTN and VoIP segment are separated, 
access price regulation does not affect the entrant’s profits, nor its entry and investment 
decisions  (for  a  formal  analysis  see  De  Bijl  &  Peitz,  2009).  Clearly,  the  incumbent 
benefits  from  the  higher  access  price  due  to  its  larger  wholesale  revenues,  whereas   15 
consumers in the VoIP-segment suffer from higher prices (as the higher access price 
translates into higher retail prices). 
 
 
4. PSTN Access Regulation and VoIP Competition 
 
4.1 The PSTN terminating access price 
 
This  section  analyzes  the  effects  of  access  regulation  on  market  outcomes,  taking 
investment  decisions  as  given.
19  Throughout  the  migration  decision  of  customers  are 
explicitly taken into account. The focus is first on the effect of the access price. Next, 
possible  additional  interventions  in  the  PSTN  retail  segment  are  discussed.  An 
elaboration of the possibility that VoIP-operators charge for terminating access if the call 
originates from a PSTN-customer, concludes. 
 
Result 1a: A higher access charge for terminating calls on the PSTN-segment, a, leads to 
less intense competition in the VoIP retail segment. Effectively, p1 and p2  increase and 
they do so at an increasing rate. 
 
It is interesting to go through the mechanism. Firstly, a higher a inflates the entrant’s 
(perceived)  marginal  cost.  Since  a  higher  access  price  increases  access  revenues,  the 
incumbent’s opportunity cost of losing customers to the VoIP segment decreases as well. 
Together  with  the  property  of  “strategic  complementarity”  this  implies  that  both 
operators will increase VoIP retail prices. Secondly, since consumers anticipate higher 
VoIP prices, more consumers stay with PSTN. As the entrant’s customers will effectively 
make more off-net calls (because of balanced calling patterns), this feeds back into higher 
expected access costs for operator 2 and marks a new “round” in which firms increase 
their prices. Hence, in equilibrium, prices increase and the market penetration of VoIP, λ, 
decreases. The latter is formulated in the following result. 
 
19 This Subsection largely summarizes and comments on the results derived in the formal analysis of De Bijl and Peitz (2009).   16 
 
Result 1b: A higher access charge for terminating calls on the PSTN-segment, a, leads to 
less migration to VoIP, that is, a smaller λ. 
 
Furthermore, it can be shown that the entrant’s profits are reduced when a increases. This 
is an intuitive result. Less intuitive is the result that the incumbent’s profits may be first 
increasing and then decreasing in a, depending on the level of the access price. For small 
values of a, a PSTN consumer is in expectations more valuable for firm 1 than a VoIP 
consumer. Thus, an increase in a which shifts consumers to the PSTN segment increases 
profits. However, for larger values of a, competition in the VoIP segment becomes more 
relaxed  so  that,  for  retail  prices  in  the  VoIP  segment  above  a  certain  level,  a  VoIP 
customer is in expectations more valuable than a PSTN customer. A lower access price 
may therefore imply higher profits for firm 1, due to the increase in size of the VoIP 
segment. 
 
Result 1c: A higher access charge for terminating calls on the PSTN-segment, a, reduces 
profits of the entrant in the VoIP segment, whereas the integrated incumbent typically 
benefits. (The former holds always, the latter is necessarily true when the firm is not 
restricted in market power in the PSTN segment.) 
 
Total welfare (the sum of producer and consumer surplus) is decreasing in access price a. 
Hence, from a welfare viewpoint, regulating the PSTN access price as low as feasible is 
desirable. Note that it was assumed that the demand for calls is perfectly inelastic. This 
implies  that  the  levels  of  retail  prices  do  not  affect  whether  consumers  purchase  a 
subscription or not. Therefore, the welfare level is determined by the division of the 
market among PSTN and VoIP, and within the VoIP segment, by the division between 
the two operators. 
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4.2 Terminating access to VoIP customers 
 
So far, it was assumed that VoIP telephone operates under a bill-and-keep environment 
and that terminating call to VoIP customers is free for calls coming from the PSTN. 
However, some VoIP operators charge for terminating access and this forms an important 
source of revenues for them. Consider therefore an access price b, the access price for 
calls originating from the PSTN-segment and terminating in the VoIP-segment. Note that 
all the comparative statics result with respect to a, derived in the previous subsection, still 
hold when keeping b constant. 
 
Suppose that a constant. A VoIP provider’s profits are increasing in b, since a higher b 
leads to higher profit margins on terminating access.
20 If the PSTN retail price is flexible, 
the PSTN operator can adjust its retail price in response to a different level of b. Here, if 
b increases, the PSTN operator, at least partially, passes the higher access price on to 
customers through a higher retail price p0. This results in a larger VoIP segment. 
 
In this argument the possibility was ignored that the terminating access price not only 
applies to calls originating from PSTN but to all off-net calls terminating on VoIP. If one 
assumes that access is charged between the VoIP networks, then the additional revenues 
for  VoIP  operator  i  are  equal  to  the  access  price  times  the  number  of  VoIP  users 
subscribed to the competing network times the share of calls terminating on operator i’s 
VoIP network, or  b p p s p p s p p s p p s b j i i j ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1
2
2 1 2 1 λ λ λ = . In addition, operator 
i also has to make payments to the other VoIP provider, equal to b times the number of its 
own VoIP customers times the share of calls terminating on the competing operator’s 
VoIP network, or  b p p s p p s p p s p p s b j i j i ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1
2
2 1 2 1 λ λ λ = . Two terms are the 
same and thus cancel out. Therefore, the conclusions about the incentive to increase b are 




20 However, if the incumbent can charge its PSTN-customers for terminating off-net there is an upper limit of b above which profits from 
terminating access decline because the reduction of the number of calls overcompensates the price effect.   18 
4.3 The PSTN retail price 
 
Consider  the  level  of  the  PSTN  retail  price  p0,  which  is  mostly  considered  to  be 
exogenous in this paper.
21 Although it may no longer be fully regulated, various forms of 
wholesale regulation still affect retail prices in the PSTN segment (e.g. resale competition 
limiting the incumbent’s market power in the retail market). Thus a fixed price for PSTN 
can be seen as a simplification of situations in which the PSTN price is less flexible than 
VoIP  prices,  for  instance  due  to  regulatory  measures  that  stimulate  unbundling  and 
resale-based  competition  in  the  PSTN  segment.  Alternatively,  universal  service 
obligations in the PSTN segment may involve a (binding) price cap. 
 
The results that are obtained more or less mirror the results with regard to access price a, 
but the underlying mechanism is different, as will be seen. Basically, an increase in p0 has 
the same effect on prices in the VoIP segment as an increase in the fixed utility of PSTN 
telephony:  it  increases  the  customer  base  for  PSTN  services,  and  hence  inflates  the 
entrant’s perceived marginal cost. 
 
Result 2: Provided that the PSTN access price a is positive, a higher PSTN retail price 
p0 leads to more intense competition in the VoIP retail segment. (This effect does not 
occur  if  a  is  zero.).  Further,  a  higher  price  for  PSTN  telephony  p0  leads  to  more 
migration to VoIP (a larger λ) and increases profits of the entrant in the VoIP segment. 
 
The mechanism is as follows. As long as the PSTN price p0 is sufficiently small, the 
incumbent’s profits are increasing, since this retail price directly feeds into profits. A 
possibly countervailing effect is the loss of market share in the retail market. However, as 
long  as  a  VoIP  customer  is  in  expectations  more  valuable  than  a  PSTN  subscriber, 
migration to VoIP is good news. This effect is reversed for larger values of the PSTN 
price, so that for a given access price a, there is a finite value of p0 that maximizes 
profits. Accordingly, although firm 1 wants to milk its PSTN customer base, if it sets its 
 
21 De Bijl and Peitz (2009) analyze two cases in which it is endogenously determined. The results that are obtained in those cases are in 
line with the results discussed here.   19 
price too high it will lose consumers to VoIP. This result lays bare an interesting link 
between the market segments, and illustrates that competition within the VoIP segment 
disciplines  the  incumbent  in  the  PSTN  segment.  Note  that  these  results  and  the 
underlying  mechanisms  describe  the  “dilemma”  that  former  PSTN  incumbents 
encountered when IP-based telephony came knocking on their doors. 
 
4.4 Competition in the PSTN-segment 
 
So far, it was assumed that there is a monopoly in the PSTN segment. However, one 
often  observes  intense  price  competition  made  possible  by  mandated  access  of  call 
origination at the incumbent’s local access network, at a regulated originating access 
price ao (“Carrier Select”-based entry). Calls generated by a competitive fringe of PSTN 
entrants without local networks, terminate either on the incumbent’s PSTN network, or 
on one of the VoIP networks. Accordingly, Carrier Select-based entrants face a perceived 
marginal cost composed of the originating acces price plus the terminating access price 
discounted by the relative size of the PSTN segment, or ao + λ0 a. 
 
If there is perfect competition in the PSTN retail segment, and if the incumbent is free to 
set PSTN price p0, then this price is driven down to the level of entrants’ perceived 
marginal cost ao + λ0 a. Note that now, access price a does not affect the size of the VoIP 
segment λ, nor does it affect market shares within that segment. An increase in a does 
increase p0, and also the perceived marginal cost of the entrant. Therefore, a higher level 
of  a  increases  retail  prices  in  both  segments.  In  terms  of  profits,  though,  only  the 
incumbent  benefits  from  a  higher  access  price,  as  the  entrant  is  just  passing  on  its 
marginal cost increase to VoIP customers. Finally, note that consumers surplus in both 
segments is reduced. 
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5. Investment Incentives 
 
This section focuses on entry incentives and (marginal) investment incentives of both 
firms in the VoIP segment under different levels of PSTN access price a. By doing so one 
is able to discuss the effects of access regulation on entry and investments. First consider 
entry. As was observed in the previous section, an operator active onloy in the VoIP 
segment finds it more difficult to operate under a regulatory regime that involves a high 
PSTN access charge. Therefore, a higher access price reduces the incentive to become 
active in the market, and hence makes entry in the VoIP-segment less likely. 
 
From an ex ante point of view, this can be formalized as follows. Suppose that the cost 
that is required to enter is unknown to the regulator. Suppose that this entry cost K is 
distributed according to some distribution function F. Depending on the access price a, 
denote the critical entry cost such that the entrant breaks even by K*(a). If the access 
price a is under the control of the regulator, by setting a the regulator implicitly chooses 
the probability of entry F(K*(a)). Since K* is decreasing in a, a higher access charge 
makes entry less likely. 
 
Result 3a: A higher access charge for terminating calls on the PSTN-segment, a, makes 
entry  into the VoIP segment less likely. 
 
Less obvious is the effect of access regulation on marginal incentives which determine 
the investment level for a given entry decision. Suppose that a higher investment level 
results (at least in expected terms) in a more attractive (or higher quality) service being 
offered. Such an investment may occur at the network level (and focus on bandwidth) or 
at  the  service/product  level  (and  then  contains  investments  in  software  and  bundled 
services such as hotlines). To focus the discussion, suppose that firms 1 and 2 in the VoIP 
segment choose investment levels  1 I  and  2 I , which are incurred after the regulatory 
policy  is  known  but  before  firms  compete  in  the  retail  market.  Note  that  in  reality, 
investment decisions are often made under a high degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless,   21 
also with respect to the regulatory policy that  will apply, it is useful to assume that 
regulatory policy is consistent over time, and thus can be communicated to firms before 
they take the relevant investment decisions.
22 
 
Using the setting presented in Section 3, each firm’s profits depend on investment levels. 
Suppose that the higher  1 I  for given  2 I , the larger firm 1’s market share in the VoIP 
segment. Correspondingly, the larger  2 I  for given  1 I , the larger firm 2’s market share in 
the VoIP segment. The firm that has invested more can set a higher price and will gain a 
larger market share. Also, insufficient investments may even drive an operator out of the 
market. For instance, if both firm invest too little, then consumers may not be interested 
in  switching  to  VoIP  at  all.  Thus  the  higher  are  investment  levels,  the  larger  is  the 
penetration rate of VoIP, λ. 
 
Since the focus has been on a symmetric environment of VoIP on the demand and the 
supply side (apart from the fact that firm 1 is vertically integrated whereas firm 2 is not), 
one may wonder whether investment incentives are symmetric in the sense that both 
firms choose the same investment levels in equilibrium. As will be seen, for an access 
price different from the underlying marginal cost of access, investment incentives are 
typically not symmetric, so that firms will choose different investment levels. 
 
Reconsider  the  profit  functions  of  firms  1  and  2,  as  reported  in  section  4: 
)] ( [ )] )( , ( [ )] ( [ ) , , ( 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 c a a p p p s c p p p p − + − + − = λλ λ λ λ λ π  for the incumbent, and 
) )( , ( ) , , ( 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 a p p p s p p p λ λ π − =  for the entrant. One can show by contradiction that 
investment incentives for firms 1 and 2 are not the same. Note that the second term in 
square brackets for firm 1 is symmetric and hence has the same structure as the profit 
function of firm 2. Thus, if a change in investment levels leaves the sum of the first and 
the  third  term  unchanged,  both  firms  would  choose  identical  investment  levels  in  a 
strategically  stable  situation.  Observe  that  typically  consumers  benefit  from  higher 
 
22 The regulator’s commitment problem and the effects on investments, a topic that merits a whole research avenue, are outside the scope 
of this paper. As has been established in the microeconomics literature, if the regulator is a long-run player he may gain commitment 
because of reputation concerns: deviating from announced policies endangers the credibility of future policy announcements.   22 
investments  by  one  firm,  if  one  takes  the  other  firm’s  investment  level  as  given. 
Therefore,  as  firm  1  increases  its  investment  level  for  VoIP,  customers  consider  the 
VoIP-option  as  more  attractive  and  more  of  them  will  migrate.  This  means  that  0 λ  
decreases and retail profits in the PSTN segment suffer from higher investment in the 
VoIP segment. Hence, there is an unambiguously negative effect of investment in the 
VoIP segment for the incumbent that does not apply to the entrant, since the latter has 
nothing  to  lose  in  other  market  segments.  For  the  incumbent  this  constitutes  a 
cannibalization  effect:  Since  higher  VoIP  investment  levels  make  more  customers 
substitute VoIP for PSTN, PSTN retail profits are cannibalized. 
 
There is, however, a second effect which has to be taken into account. Investment levels 
also affect the flow of calls between segments and thus firm 1’s profits from granting 
access. Given that calling patterns are balanced, the largest number of calls crossing from 
VoIP to PSTN occurs when both segments are of equal size. The number of calls between 
firm 2 and the PSTN-segment of firm 1 is maximal if the share of the PSTN segment is 
1/3 in the special case that firm 1 and firm 2 share the VoIP-segment equally. Investment 
levels determine the size of the two segments. Surprisingly, firm 1 may actually have 
stronger incentives to invest than firm 2 if it can increase the volume of calls terminating 
on the PSTN-segment because this will increase profits at the wholesale level (i.e., profits 
from granting access). This effect can be called access revenue effect. It is of ambiguous 
sign because a change in a may increase or decrease access revenues. Hence, it depends 
on specific market conditions whether this effect is positive or negative. If the access 
revenue effect is negative, both effects go in the same direction. If it is positive but not 
too large, the cannibalization effect will dominate. In both instances the finding then is 
that firm 2 invests more than firm 1 in an equilibrium. Summarizing: 
 
Result 3b: If the cannibalization effect is strong, the integrated firm (firm 1) tends to 
invest less in its VoIP-infrastructure and services than the VoIP-provider (firm 2). 
 
Accordingly, it may happen that the incumbent strategically underinvests in VoIP. The 
rationale is as follows. Consumers observe the relatively lower quality of the incumbent’s   23 
VoIP-service. They thus anticipate weakened competition in the VoIP-segment, which 
makes  migration  to  VoIP  less  attractive,  because  of  high  expected,  quality-adjusted 
prices. 
 
If the cannibalization effect is strong, there may be a concern of entry deterrence through 
underinvestment.  To  see  this,  suppose  that  the  incumbent  underinvests.  A  potential 
entrant  will  anticipate  this,  and  hence  knows  that  the  incumbent  firm  will  be  a 
“weakened” competitor. At the same time, the entrant has no possibilities (and hence 
cannot commit) to offer a low-price alternative to the incumbent’s PSTN-services. The 
reason is that since the retail price can be easily changed in the short term, the entrant 
cannot commit to a certain price. Thus, the entrant rationally expects that few consumers 
will migrate to VoIP. This makes entry less attractive, since there are less profits to be 
made to recover investment consts.. In the extreme, the refusal of the incumbent to offer 
VoIP  services  may  deter  entry  from  other  VoIP  providers.  The  incumbent’s 
unwillingness to offer VoIP services leads to monopoly pricing in the VoIP segment. 
Consumers foresee this and, therefore, the new technology will be embraced by only few 
of them. While the entrant’s profit margin per consumer goes up, the entrant will be 
unable to attract many consumers. It may therefore be unable to recover its entry costs. 
Thus, the entrant anticipates that it is not profitable to enter.  
 
Result 3c: The vertically integrated firm may want to strategically underinvest in VoIP in 
order to deter entry. 
 
In other words, the underinvestment by the incumbent leads to more rent extraction by 
the entrant. This discourages consumers from adopting the new technology and, thus, 
makes entry unprofitable. 
 
It is interesting to take a closer look at the role of the access price in this context. Note 
that  due  to  consumers’  lumpy  migration  decision,  the  incumbent’s  and  the  entrant’s 
investments are complementary, in the sense that the profitability of entrant’s investment 
relies on the incumbent investing and vice versa, given entry. However, in the a dynamic   24 
setting with entry, the incumbent can strategically exploit the entrant’s reliance on the 
incumbent’s investment. A higher access price in an environment in which only firm 2 
offers VoIP will reduce the entrant’s profits. Thus, it becomes more likely that strategic 
underinvestment by the incumbent in the VoIP segment makes this segment sufficiently 
unattractive to consumers and, therefore, to the entrant. Possibly, the latter cannot recover 
its  fixed  cost.  This  implies  that  a  higher  access  price  increases  the  risk  of  strategic 
underinvestment by the incumbent. In the extreme, a high PSTN access price may lead to 
the VoIP sector not taking off at all. 
 
To summarize the argument, note that entry deterrence by underinvestment in VoIP may 
occur in a market in which the incumbent would develop the VoIP sector on its own if 
the entry decision was exogenous. Given the incumbent’s investment, the entrant would 
also invest. However, for strategic reasons the incumbent may refrain from investing in 
VoIP.  The  welfare  implication  is  that  society  could  be  better  off  under  a  protected 
monopoly for the incumbent in the VoIP-segment than under competition. This of course 
a rather stylized result, and should be explored in more detail in case studies and richer 
models. While strategic underinvestment may be impossible to sustain over a prolonged 
period, the risk of delayed investment is a real possibility. Indeed, this argument provides 
an alternative light to the example of the Netherlands given in the Introduction. Instead of 
having hastened to introduce VoIP, and being unprepared for the large initial uptake, it 
may have been the case that incumbent KPN has underinvested with the aim of putting a 
brake on the growth of the VoIP segment. Indeed, the resulting negative press may easily 
have made consumers more skeptical about VoIP in general, and wary to switch to any 
VoIP provider. In the terms of the analysis here, this corresponds to the effect that less 
consumers migrate to VoIP, making entry into the VoIP segment less attractive. 
 
To make entry deterrence happen, though, some assumption is necessary along the line 
that the entrant cannot commit itselves to make the VoIP market attractive on its own. 
Furthermore, the entry deterrence argument critically hinges on the fact that there are 
limited alternatives to the incumbent’s offers. Such a situation is a good description for 
markets  in  which  cable  provides  the  only  feasible  alternative  infrastructure  to  the   25 
incumbent’s upgraded (IP-enabled) network. If however more than one entrant becomes 
active,  there  is  likely  to  be  competition  among  entrants  which  consumers  rationally 
foresee. Thus, even if the incumbent did not enter the new segment, consumers may 
expect low prices in the VoIP segment which makes switching attractive. Put differently, 
the strategic role of the incumbent’s investment decision is less pronounced if there is 
more than one potential entrant. Entry by multiple firms will lead to intense competition 
even in the absence of the incumbent firm, making the VoIP segment more attractive. 
 
One possibility is that operators without a physical network can also offer VoIP-services. 
Also in this case the effect of the incumbent’s actions on the intensity of competition in 
the VoIP-segment is less pronounced and the possibility of entry deterrence is of less 
concern. Note the implied rationale for mandating access to the incumbent’s network, 
which is different from the motivations that were put forward after liberalization of the 
telecoms market (e.g. facilitating entry, stimulating entrants to advance on the “ladder of 
investment”).  Here,  if  underinvestment  is  an  effective  mechanism  to  slow  down  the 
development of the VoIP segment, mandating access to the incumbent’s VoIP network 
may prevent the “abuse” of this mechanism as a means of entry deterrence. 
 
While  the  entry  deterrence  result  suggests  underinvestment  by  the  incumbent,  under 
alternative conditions the incumbent’s investment incentives may be rather strong. To see 
this, expand a bit more on the earlier result 3a. Suppose that the cannibalization effect is 
relatively  weak,  that  is,  customers  in  the  PSTN-segment  contribute  little  to  retail 
revenues.  The  PSTN  terminating  access  price  is  above  the  marginal  cost  of  call 
termination. Furthermore, suppose that only a small fraction of consumers migrates to the 
VoIP segment. Then, because of the access revenue effect, the incumbent actually has 
stronger investment incentives than the entrant to invest. Note that an increase in the 
access price increases the asymmetry in the investment decision of firms 1 and 2. In other 
words, a higher access price makes the access revenue effect more pronounced. Thus the 
following result is obtained: 
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Result 3d: If the cannibalization effect is relatively small, the vertically integrated firm 





The  emergence  of  VoIP,  which  is,  in  turn,  driven  by  broadband,  creates  various 
challenges for policy makers and regulators. Of course, NRAs have to address how they 
should regulate VoIP (see De Bijl & Peitz, 2005, 2006a). Various countries, including 
Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Slovak 
Republic,  Turkey,  and  the  US,  have,  at  least  initially,  imposed  minimum  or  no 
regulations  specific  to  VoIP  services.    Other  countries,  including  Australia,  Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, view 
VoIP  services  offered  to  the  public  as  a  telecommunications  service,  which  is  then 
subject to regulations as those for PSTN services.  
 
A central point in this paper has been that, in addition to the issue of regulation of VoIP, 
NRAs have to be aware of negative side-effects that may be caused by PSTN regulation 
on the emergence of VoIP. For instance, higher prices for terminating access to the PSTN 
network  slow  down  the  adoption  of  VoIP  and  reduce  the  profits  of  entrants  that 
exclusively offer VoIP telephony. Of particular interest have been possible implications 
for the incentives to invest in VoIP. Among others, the link between access regulation in 
PSTN and distortions of VoIP investment decisions has been pointed out. Thus policy 
makers and regulators have to think beyond the framework of “traditionally” defined 
markets, and take interactions between (converging) markets into account, in order to 
avoid well-intended but socially costly interventions. This paper points out the relevance 
and importance of this problem. A more detailed and specific analysis is left to future 
research. For instance, for practical cases, a regulator may want to expand the model in   27 




As also discussed in De Bijl and Peitz (2009), the results seem to be quite robust as long 
as  one  makes  adaptations  that  do  not  stray  too  far  from  the  structure  of  the  model. 
However, a change that certainly goes beyond the model is the incorporation of internet-
based (unmanaged) VoIP providers like Skype, who play according to different rules, 
based on different business models. Such an entrant can bypass the PSTN altogether as 
various peer-to-peer VoIP services have demonstrated. This type of bypass reduces the 
incumbent’s incentive to set high terminating access charges. Moreover, for this type of 
entrant, building a customer base—making maximum use of network effects—is the first 
step. At a later stage, complementary functionality, for instance through integration with 
an  e-market  environment,  may  be  added,  while  revenues  are  generated  through 
advertising. To analyze the disruptive effects of such business models on more traditional 
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